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SPACE-BASED FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH AND THE
ITAR:A STUDY IN VAGUENESS, OVERBREADTH, AND
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Rachel Lehmer Claus, Esq.*
INTRODUCTION
“Fundamental research” is openly conducted science and
engineering research carried out at institutions of higher education in the
United States.1 Faculty, students, collaborators and other researchers in
these institutions engage in the free, constant, and lively exchange of ideas
with their peers in the U.S. and abroad. This freedom of speech and
association, and the openness that attends it, are fundamental to our
culture and vital to the success of our research universities. Many of the
extraordinary advances in science and technology of the last few decades
derived from and flourished in the atmosphere of open communication
that is a hallmark of academic scientific communities.2
*

Ms. Claus is University Counsel for the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC),
Stanford University; however, the opinions expressed in this paper are hers alone and do
not necessarily reflect the view of Stanford University or its Linear Accelerator Center.
Ms. Claus gratefully acknowledges the technical assistance of Azita Saghafi, second year
student at the Santa Clara University School of Law, in bringing this article to
publication.
1
“‘Fundamental research’ is defined as basic and applied research in science and
engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the
scientific community, …” National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and
Engineering Information, National Security Decision Directive 189 (Sept. 21, 1998)
[hereinafter National Security Decision Directive 189] available at
http://www.aau.edu/research/ITAR-NSDD189.html. For purposes of this discussion, the
term “basic” refers to experimental or theoretical work, undertaken primarily to acquire
new knowledge and to develop related concepts and principles, without anticipating any
particular use; the term “applied” refers similar original research that will result in new
knowledge, but directed primarily toward a specific practical objective. ORGANISATION
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FRASCATI MANUAL 2002: PROPOSED STANDARD
PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT, at 30
(2002).
2
Maintaining this fruitful environment is of sufficient import to have prompted a number
of universities to develop formal policies that preclude the acceptance of restrictions on
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In fact, it is a signal mark of fundamental research that it is carried
out in the public domain. During the mid-1980s, at the height of the Cold
War, President Ronald Reagan issued a formal policy3 to give primacy to
the importance our nation attaches to such openly conducted research.
That policy defined “fundamental research” as the conduct of basic and
applied research in science and engineering, the results of which are made
available to the interested scientific community. It also established that
fundamental research, unclassified and nonproprietary, conducted by U.S.
academies is a proper subject of international scientific exchanges not
subject to the restrictions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation.
Ultimately many of the advances derived from fundamental
research and unclassified technologies have benefited the U.S. military as
well as invigorated our economy. Science and technology are deemed
elements critical to economic vigor.4 That said, those dedicated to national
security rightly must be vigilant to ensure that vital defense technologies
are not lost to those who would use them against us. Disclosure and access
restrictions on particular types of research, through classification5 and

the conduct and dissemination of their research. Many decline research if the sponsor
thereof is able to restrict dissemination or to deny to any otherwise eligible researcher or
student the ability to participate in or access the intellectually significant portions of a
research project. See Stanford University, Research Policy Handbook: Openness in
Research, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/2-6.html (last modified Feb. 15,
2001). This type of policy effectively eliminates proprietary, classified, or other secret
research from the endeavors undertaken by fundamental research universities. As an aid
to such institutions, the Council on Governmental Relations of the Association of
American Universities maintains a website (with MIT) listing the types of restrictive
clauses to be avoided in research contracts, see http://mit.edu/osp/www (last visited Jun.
8, 2004).
3
National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1.
4
National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators-2002, 1 SCI. AND ENG’G
INDICATORS-2002 (2002).
5
Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995) (describing the general
classification policy of the federal government), available at
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12958.html (n.d.). Section 1.7(b) provides that basic
scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be
classified. However, Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003),
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other official forms of secrecy, have been effectively used to protect
against that threat. Inevitably, however, some tension exists between the
national security establishment and the open academies upon which they
draw.6 For the most part, U.S. universities have found methods to manage
such conflicts. For example, as noted, some confront the dilemma by
declining to undertake classified or secret research. Others establish
separate entities to undertake “black box” research; the Lincoln
Laboratory operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is an
example of this sequestering.
Recent events, however, have caused a dramatic increase in the
tension between the two important national priorities of security and open
academies with regard to university fundamental research that is spacebased, satellite-reliant, or spacecraft related. Although space has been
utilized as a research platform by universities for decades, and even
though universities have been major participants in fundamental research
contributing to spacecraft research throughout this time, today the
openness inherent in such university-based research gives rise to more
direct conflict and heightened restrictions. In this newly enflamed arena,
commentators are voicing concerns about the stifling of scientific
innovation, which in turn, adversely impacts both economic health and

added a new clause to section 1.5 that permits classification of scientific, technological,
or economic matters related to national security and defense against transnational
bioterrorism. For a discussion on the topic of national security and classification, see
ARVIN S. QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: PRINCIPLES FOR
CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION at Ch. 5 (1993) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist2/index.html.
6
For excellent discussions demonstrating the long history of this tension, see, e.g.,
Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First Amendment
Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1981), and Shinn, The First Amendment and
the Export Laws: Free Speech on Scientific & Technical Matters, 58 GEO. L.J. 368
(1990).
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national security.7

4

An atmosphere of “secrecy and burdensome

regulations” makes it difficult to recruit both domestic and foreign talent
to science and technology research, even though foreign researchers have
been and continue to be “critical to the vitality of American innovation.”8
This sea-change came about in 1999 when Congress mandated that
export licensing jurisdiction of all satellites and related equipment and
services, irrespective of military utility, be transferred from the
Department of Commerce (under the Export Administration Regulations,
or EAR9) to the Department of State10 (under the International Traffic in
Arms Regulation, or ITAR11). Consequently, information about research,
experimental, and scientific satellites is currently being treated as ITARcontrolled “technical data” despite the fact that much of the hardware and
information about it has been in the public domain from 30 years
(satellites) to 50 years (rocketry) and is not classified. Further, the ITAR
itself states that information in the public domain is not subject to

7

See, e.g., Alice P. Gast, Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., The Impact of Restricting
Information Access on Science and Technology, at http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf
(2003); ASHTON B. CARTER ET AL., KEEPING THE EDGE: MANAGING DEFENSE FOR THE
FUTURE (2000); The Henry L. Stimson Center and Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls for US National
Security: Final Report, at
http://www.stimson.org/newpubs.cfm?PT=2&SB=0&P=0&StartRow=31 (Apr. 2001).
8
Alice P. Gast, Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., The Impact of Restricting Information
Access on Science and Technology 4-5, at http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf (2003).
9
Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2003 or 1979), implemented by the
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730 -774.1, available at
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexccl.pdf (last modified May 6, 2004). [Note: the
EAA expired on August 20, 2001, but the EAR is maintained in effect under the authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Exec. Order
No.13,222, 3 C.F.R. 13,222 (2002).]
10
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 2267, 10 U.S.C. § 7420.
11
The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1979), Priv. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat
503 (Sept. 29, 1979), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120 – 130 (2002), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_01/22cfr121_01.html (Apr. 1, 2001).
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disclosure restrictions and access controls,12 a position recently reiterated
by the State Department13 and also found in case law.14
As a result, universities operating in the public domain and
carrying out unclassified spacebased research in various disciplines
(environmental studies, bio-molecular research, particle and astrophysics,
cosmology) may find they are not allowed to involve foreign students,
faculty, and collaborators unless they first obtain an export license15 from
the State Department. Based on ITAR treatment of “associated
equipment,” “related systems,” and “payloads,” similar licensing issues
emerge with regard to such academic endeavors as aero- and astronautics,
robotics, nanotechnology, mechanical and electrical engineering, optics,
remote sensing devices, and computing and data acquisition systems.
Universities undertake such study and research in the public domain,
bringing to bear on these disciplines the world’s best minds and exposing
their work to the stimulating rigors of peer review and intellectual
competition.
This paper will explore how the ITAR only minimally implements
National Security Decision Directive 189 as it relates to spacecraft-related
fundamental research16 and how it imposes licensing restrictions on the
dissemination of information, falling within the realm of protected
12

22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (2004); 22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (2004).
67 Fed. Reg. 15,099-15,101 (March 29, 2002) (wherein the State Department stated
that it was State Department policy to not regulate fundamental research, by definition,
research that is in the public domain.).
14
United States v.Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989). Dismissal was granted as to the
cause of action relating to export of technical information available through the Freedom
of Information Act, which the Defense Department considered in the public domain and
thus exempt from export control.
15
Obtaining such a license may be difficult and time-consuming, and the process, bereft
of clear standards is unpredictable. Moreover, merely submitting to such a restriction may
alter forever and adversely the character and treatment of the research (22 C.F.R. §
120.11(8)(ii) provides that the acceptance of, among other things, dissemination
restrictions precludes characterizing the research as “fundamental.”).
16
See also John R. Liebman, Scientific Research and Technical Data Export Controls:
When Two Worlds Collide, 11 INT’L L.J. ST. B. ASS’N CAL. NO. 2 (2001-2002).
13
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speech.17 The restrictions may violate constitutional due process
protections and constitutional safeguards against prior restraint.18
I. NSDD 189, PUBLIC LAW 105-261, AND ITAR
A. The POLICY
In 1985, then President Ronald Wilson Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 189, which was released by the National
Security Council pursuant to Executive Order 12,356.19 This pivotal
document establishes a national policy with regard to fundamental
research. It reads as follows:
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 189
NATIONAL POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC,
TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING INFORMATION
I. PURPOSE
This directive establishes national policy for controlling the
flow of science, technology and engineering information
produced in federally funded fundamental research at
colleges, universities, and laboratories. Fundamental
research is defined as follows:
“Fundamental research” means basic and
applied research in science and engineering,
the results of which ordinarily are published
and shared broadly within the scientific
community,
as
distinguished
from
proprietary research and from industrial
development, design, production, and
17

For an interesting discussion of scientific information as protected speech, see
Bernstein v. Department of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) and Bernstein v.
Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the District Court and the Court of
Appeals discuss public domain information, speech, and export controls.
18
For an analysis of these issues from a private sector perspective, see Ronald J. Sievert,
Has the Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S. Export Control Regime?, 37 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 89 (Winter 2002).
19
Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 12,356 (1982), at
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12356.html (Apr. 2, 1982).
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ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or
national security reasons.
II. BACKGROUND
The acquisition of advanced technology from the United
States by the Eastern Block nations for the purpose of
enhancing their military capabilities poses a significant
threat to our national security. Intelligence studies indicate
a small but significant target of the Eastern Bloc
intelligence gathering effort is science and engineering
research performed at universities and federal laboratories.
At the same time, our leadership position in science and
technology is an essential element in our economic and
physical security. The strength of American science
requires a research environment conducive to creativity, an
environment in which the free exchange of ideas is a vital
component.
III. POLICY
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum
extent possible, the products of fundamental research
remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this
Administration that, where the national security requires
control, the mechanism for control of information
generated during federally funded fundamental research in
science, technology and engineering at colleges,
universities and laboratories is classification. Each federal
government agency is responsible for: a) determining
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if
so, controlling the research results through standard
classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all
research grants, contracts or cooperative agreements for
potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon
the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundament
research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S.
Statutes.

7
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12,958,

“Classified

National
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Security

Information”20 (17 April 1995) describes the general classification policy
of the federal government.21 In section 1.7(b), it states that basic scientific
research information not clearly related to the national security may not be
classified.
The policy enunciated in NSDD 18922 has been reaffirmed by
every Administration since 1985, including the current one (George W.
Bush). In a letter dated November 1, 2001, to Dr. Harold Brown, cochairman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS),
Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush,
wrote:
“The key to maintaining U.S. technological preeminence is
to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The
linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific
innovation, prosperity, and U.S. national security is
undeniable. This linkage is especially true as our armed
forces depend less and less on internal research and
development for the innovations they need to maintain the
military superiority of the United States. In the context of
broad-based review of our technology transfer controls that
will begin this year, this Administration will review and
update as appropriate the export control policies that affect
basic research in the United States. In the interim, the
policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and
engineering information set forth in NSDD-189 shall
remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy is
followed.”23 [emphasis added]
20

Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,823, at
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/eo_12958.html (Apr. 17, 1995).
21
Interestingly, ITAR strictures, discussed infra, are often more stringent than would be
required if the information or technology had been classified, due to ITAR’s
vague,imprecise, and inconsistent requirements, generally interpreted by an
administrative official untrained as to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike those
operating within the ITAR regime, those operating in a classified environment, regulators
and the regulated alike, know exactly how to proceed and what to expect.
22
National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1.
23
Condoleezza Rice Letter on NSDD-189, at
http://www.aau.edu/research/Rice11.1.01.html (Nov. 1, 2001).

Vol. 2 [2003]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

9

B. The LEGISLATION
In the wake of the Cox Report24 and the allegations of spying at the
Los Alamos National Laboratories, Congress legislatively reiterated the
importance of the Missile Technology Control Regime: "[D]ue to the
sensitivity of technologies involved, it is in the national security interests
of the United States that United States satellites and related items be
subject to the same export controls that apply...to munitions."25 That Act
further stated that all satellites and related items that were on the
Commerce Department dual-use list were to be transferred to State
Department Munitions List and made subject to the International Traffic in
Arms Regulation.26

Prior to the changes, the ITAR generally had

jurisdiction over satellites of specific military design or capability. The
1999 changes to the implementing regulations (the ITAR) expressly listed
for the first time “experimental, scientific, and research” satellites,
associated systems, and related equipment.27 Most of this technology and
its related information had served a preponderantly civilian purpose for
decades; information on how to build these types of satellites and rockets
had been in the public domain for 30 and 50 years, respectively.28
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President to
control the import and export of defense articles and defense services by
24

H.R. REP. NO. 105-851 (Jun. 14 1999), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851-html/index.html (Jun. 14, 1999) and
http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/report/welcome2.html (1999).
25
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-251, 112 Stat. 2267, 10 U.S.C. § 7420.
26
Id.
27
See also 15 C.F.R. § 774 Supp.1 n.4 [ECCN 9A004] (delegating licensing jurisdiction
of satellites and their payload to the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department
of State.). See http://www.pmdtc.org for more on treatment of “space qualified” items.
28
Specifications and other technical information concerning fabrication of Delta-series
rockets had been available on a publicly accessible website, having previously been
approved for release by the Secretary of the Air Force. Those websites were recently
dismantled, but you can get a flavor of what they once were by visiting
http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap951213.html and
http://www.universetoday.com/html/topics/delta.html.
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designating such items to the United States Munitions List (USML).29
The USML resides in the ITAR at Part 120, and the expressly stated
purpose of ITAR is to control export/import of defense articles and
defense services.30 Furthermore, anything that is to be added to the USML
must be designed or intended for military use (or activities intended to
support military use) and not have a predominant civilian use or civilian
performance equivalence.31
C. The REGULATIONS
The general rule is that a license or other approval must be
obtained from the State Department in order to export a defense article or
to provide a defense service.32 In parsing the ITAR for this discussion, I
have emphasized in boldface any language of particular import to this
discussion.
“Export” means:
(1) Sending or taking a defense article out of the United
States in any manner, except by mere travel outside of the
United States by a person whose personal knowledge
includes technical data; or
(2) Transferring registration, control or ownership to a
foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered
by the U.S. Munitions List, whether in the United States or
abroad; or
(3) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or
transferring in the United States any defense article to an
embassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign
government (e.g., diplomatic missions); or
(4) Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or
transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in
the United States or abroad (this would affect foreign
students, scientists, and researchers admitted to the U.S.
29

22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2004).
22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2004).
31
22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004).
32
22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2004).
30
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by the State Department on the appropriate visa to pursue a
particular course of study or research); or
(5) Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the
benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or
abroad.33
As a general proposition, I will use the term “deemed export” to
describe the situation where a foreign national on U.S. soil may be
exposed to or have access in any manner to an export-controlled item or
export-controlled information, as described at (4) above.
A “Defense Article” is anything on the United States
Munitions List (USML).34 The term includes technical data
recorded or stored in any physical form, as well as models,
mockups or other items that reveal technical data directly
relating to items on the USML.35
A “Defense Service” may consist of any of the following:
(1) furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign
persons, whether in the United States or abroad in the
design,
development,
engineering,
manufacture,
production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance,
modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction,
processing or use of defense articles; (2) furnishing to
foreign persons of any technical data controlled by the
ITAR, whether in the United States or abroad; or (3)
military training of foreign units and forces, regular and
irregular, including formal or informal instruction of
foreign persons in the United States or abroad or by
correspondence courses, technical, educational, or
information publications and media of all kinds, training
aids, orientation, training exercise, and military advice.36
It is noteworthy that the training activity described by item (3) may
involve utilization of information in the public domain. In fact, elsewhere
33

22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2004) (emphasis added).
22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (2004).
35
Id.
36
22 C.F.R. § 120.9 (2004) (emphasis added).
34
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in the ITAR it is stated that the provision to a foreign national of even
public

domain

information

otherwise

exempted

from

licensing

requirements is designated a defense service requiring a license.37
The term “Technical Data” means any of the following:
(1) Information, other than software (defined elsewhere),
which is required for the design, development, production,
manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing,
maintenance or modification of defense articles (this
includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans,
instructions and documentation);
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and
defense services;
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; or
(4) Software directly related to defense articles.
ITAR expressly excludes from this definition
information concerning general scientific, mathematical
or engineering principles commonly taught in schools,
colleges and universities, information in the public
domain, and basic marketing information on function or
purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles.38
“Public Domain” is the term used to describe information
which is published and which is generally accessible or
available to the public through a variety of familiar means:
(1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores;
(2) Through subscriptions which are available without
restriction to any individual who desires to obtain or
purchase the published information;
(3) Through second class mailing privileges granted by the
U.S. Government;
(4) At libraries open to the public or from which the public
can obtain documents;
(5) Through patents available at any patent office;
(6) Through unlimited distribution at a conference,
meeting, seminar, trade show or exhibition, generally
accessible to the public, in the United States;
(7) Through public release (i.e., unlimited distribution) in

37
38

22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004).
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (2004) (emphasis added).
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any form after approval by the cognizant U.S. government
department or agency;39
(8) Through fundamental research in science and
engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning
in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily
published and shared broadly in the scientific
community. In keeping with NSDD 189, Fundamental
Research is defined as basic and applied research in
science and engineering where the resulting information
is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the
scientific community.40 University research will not be
considered fundamental research if the University or its
researchers accept restrictions on publication of scientific
and technical information resulting from the project or
activity, or the research is funded by the U.S. Government
and specific access and dissemination controls are
applicable to the information resulting from the research.41
“Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment” in ITAR
includes scientific, research, and experimental satellites.42
These are deemed Significant Military Equipment (SME) if
intended for use by foreign armed services (SME is a
designation which may make anything subject to special
restrictions based on substantial military utility or
capability).43 Finally, the term “Associated Equipment”44
encompasses a wide variety of items (such as mechanical
adapters and interface hardware commercially available in
the private sector), test equipment used in other arenas,
ground control elements, tracking systems, Global

39

For example, specifications and other technical information concerning fabrication of
Delta-series rockets had, until just recently, been available on a publicly accessible
website, having previously been approved for release by the Secretary of the Air Force.
Those websites have been dismantled, but you can get a flavor of what they once were by
clicking on http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap951213.html and
http://www.universetoday.com/html/topics/delta.html.
40
22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (2004) (emphasis added).
41
Id.
42
22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV (2004) (emphasis added).
43
Id.
44
22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV(e) (2004).
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Positioning Systems, and any scientific or research
“payload.”45
“Registration” with the Department of State, Office of
Defense Trade Controls, is required for any person (a
natural person, corporation, business association,
partnership,
society,
trust,
organization,
group,
46
governmental entity, or any other group ) who either
manufactures or exports defense articles or defense
services. Registration is a prerequisite to the issuance of an
export license, or other approval or authorization.47
However, persons who engage only in the fabrication of
articles for experimental or scientific purpose, including
research and development, are not required to so
register.48

45

22 C.F.R. § 121.1, XV(e) (2004). The State Department has amended the ITAR with
regard to Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment fabricated only for fundamental
research purposes and which involve research, experimental, and scientific satellites also
appearing on the Munitions List (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg.
15,099-15,101 (Mar. 29, 2002)). The State Department noted in its discussion of the Final
Rule that it was State Department policy to not regulate fundamental research and that the
“…the March transfer of commercial communications satellites to the USML did not
change this policy.” None of this language appears in the Final Rule itself. Moreover, the
new exemptions of general applicability provided by the Final Rule (22 C.F.R. section
123.16(b)(10) and section 125.4(d)(1)) are limited to public domain information, which is
not subject to ITAR controls in the first place.
46
22 C.F.R. § 120.14 (2004).
47
22 C.F.R. § 122.1 (2004).
48
Id. (emphasis added).
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Licenses49 are required for the export of technical data and
classified and unclassified defense articles50 and defense services,51 unless
49

Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles. 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2004).
(a) Any person who intends to export or to import temporarily a defense article must
obtain the approval of the Office of Defense Trade Controls prior to the export or
temporary import, unless the export or temporary import qualifies for an exemption under
the provisions of this subchapter. Applications for export or temporary import must be
made as follows:
(1) Applications for licenses for permanent export must be made on Form DSP-5
(unclassified);
(2) Applications for licenses for temporary export must be made on Form DSP-73
(unclassified);
(3) Applications for licenses for temporary import must be made on Form DSP-61
(unclassified); and
(4) Applications for the export or temporary import of classified defense articles or
classified technical data must be made on Form DSP-85.
(b) Applications for Department of State export licenses must be confined to proposed
exports of defense articles including technical data.
(c) As a condition to the issuance of a license or other approval, the Office of Defense
Trade Controls may require all pertinent documentary information regarding the
proposed transaction and proper completion of the application form as follows:
(1) Form DSP-5, DSP-61, DSP-73, and DSP-85 applications must have an entry in each
block where space is provided for an entry. All requested information must be provided.
(2) Attachments and supporting technical data or brochures should be submitted in seven
collated copies. Two copies of any freight forwarder lists must be submitted. If the
request is limited to renewal of a previous license or for the export of spare parts, only
two sets of any attachment (including freight forwarder lists) and one copy of the
previous license should be submitted.
(3) A certification letter signed by an empowered official must accompany all application
submissions (see Sec. 126.13 of this subchapter).
(4) An application for a license under this part for the permanent export of defense
articles sold commercially must be accompanied by a copy of a purchase order, letter of
intent or other appropriate documentation. In cases involving the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales program, three copies of the relevant Department of Defense Form 1513 are
required, unless the procedures of Sec. 126.4(c) or Sec. 126.6 of this subchapter are
followed.
(5) Form DSP-83, duly executed, must accompany all license applications for the
permanent export of significant military equipment, including classified hardware or
classified technical data (see Secs. 123.10 and 125.3 of this subchapter).
(6) A statement concerning the payment of political contributions, fees and commissions
must accompany a permanent export application if the export involves defense articles or
defense services valued in an amount of $500,000 or more and is being sold
commercially to or for the use of the armed forces of a foreign country or international
organization (see part 130 of this subchapter).
(d) Provisions for furnishing the type of defense services described in Sec. 120.9(a) of
this subchapter are contained in part 124 of this subchapter. Provisions for the export or
temporary import of technical data and classified defense articles are contained in part
125 of this subchapter.
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the export is of public domain information.52 A license is also required for
a disclosure, on U.S. soil, of technical data to any person or entity that is
not a lawful permanent resident or a protected individual.53

The

requirement applies to oral, visual, or documentary disclosure, regardless
of the manner in which the information is transmitted. The provision to a
foreign national of even public domain information otherwise
exempted from licensing requirements is a defense service requiring a
license.54

The licensing provisions of the ITAR also state that the

“exemptions of general applicability” otherwise available do not
extend to applied research.55
Early in 2002, the State Department amended the ITAR with
regard to Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment fabricated only
for fundamental research purposes – but which involve research,
experimental, and scientific satellites also appearing on the Munitions
List.56 The State Department noted that, as a matter of policy, it did not
regulate fundamental research and that the “…the March transfer of
commercial communications satellites to the USML did not change this
policy.” However, none of this language appears in the Final Rule itself.
Moreover, the new exemptions of general applicability provided by the
Final Rule (22 C.F.R. section 123.16(b)(10) and section 125.4(d)(1)) are
limited to public domain information, which by definition is not subject to
ITAR controls in the first place.57

50

22 C.F.R. § 125.1 (2004).
22 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2004).
52
22 C.F.R. pt. 125 (2004).
53
22 C.F.R. §§ 125.2(c), 120.16 (2004).
54
22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004) (emphasis added).
55
22 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)(3) (2004) (emphasis added).
56
67 Fed. Reg. 15,099 (Mar. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 123, 125).
57
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004).
51
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II. THE QUANDARY
Anyone reading the ITAR will be understandably perplexed and
confused by the conflicting, vague, and ambiguous provisions encountered
therein, especially when attempting to align the regulations with the
concept of fundamental research.
As an express statement of national policy, NSDD 189 accords
special treatment to the conduct of basic and applied research in science
and engineering, the results of which are in the public domain, in the form
of relief from many of the deemed export restrictions that might otherwise
apply. This is done in order to facilitate niversity-based international
collaborations, among other things. Furthermore, according to the
authorizing statute58 and the ITAR’s statement of purpose,59 anything that
is to be added to the USML should not have preponderant civilian use or
civilian performance equivalence.
In addition to confounding a national policy and its own statement
of purpose with regard to university-based satellite-reliant or –related
fundamental research, ITAR’s scattered and various provisions on the
same subject are contradictory. ITAR purports to have no jurisdiction over
information in the public domain.60 ITAR also states that technical data
for ITAR purposes does not include “information concerning general
scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in
schools, colleges, and universities or information in the public
domain…”61 Those who fabricate an article for a scientific or
experimental purpose need not register with the State Department (a
precursor to licensing). Yet nonmilitary satellites appear to be subject to
ITAR’s licensing and nondisclosure requirements by virtue of their recent
58

22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2004).
22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004).
60
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004).
61
Id.
59
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inclusion on the USML. These satellites, information about which has
been in the public domain for decades, are intended to carry (and have
historically carried) university space-based research payloads and do not
meet the “defense article” criteria. Yet providing even public domain
information about space-based research to a foreign student presumably
might land the discloser in jail as the unlicensed provision of a defense
service.62
The ambiguous treatment of fundamental research creates quite a
quandary for those involved in university-based unclassified aeronautics
and astronautics programs, as well as in courses in the fields of electrical
engineering, computing, optics, and mechanical engineering, which deal
with principles and applications that are not classified or secret. Those
involved in university-based spacecraft-related research or teaching are
not able to determine, no matter how carefully they parse the ITAR,
whether their activities are subject to ITAR restrictions that will affect
who may participate in those courses or have access to that research.
Although beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted the
decision to transfer back to the State Department jurisdiction over the
export of satellites and related equipment and services has had an adverse
effect on the US satellite (and related) industry.63 Within months of that
enactment, that industry lost almost half of its market due to export
licensing issues, and many of those needing such services have since
turned to satellite and launch providers in Europe and elsewhere, which
are advancing their technologies and market share free of such constraints.
This causes a further question to arise: Did the transfer of preponderantly

62

See 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004).
Final Report of the Comm’n on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/aerospacecommission.htm
(Nov. 2002).
63

Vol. 2 [2003]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

19

civilian use satellites to the USML remove a threat or create a
vulnerability?
A. PUBLIC DOMAIN SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
A seminal question is whether public domain “scientific speech” is
protected by the Freedom of Speech guarantees of the First Amendment.
There is little case law directly on the subject of public domain scientific
information,64 but an affirmative answer to this question appears in a
memo issued by the Justice Department in the late 1970s, in the context of
publishing publicly available information about encryption.65
In 1977, public key cryptography was virtually unknown outside of
the National Security Administration and academia. When an NSA
employee opined that academic publication of an article on that subject
would violate export control laws, the Justice Department, Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), issued a series of opinions on the issue.
The first of these, known as the “Harmon Memo,” concluded that
"the regulatory provisions present questions of overbreadth and
vagueness,", and that "[t]he ITAR requirement of a license as a
prerequisite to 'exports' of cryptographic information clearly raises First
Amendment questions of prior restraint."66 The Harmon memo found that
dissemination
64

restrictions

on

this

admittedly

publicly

available

The Supreme Court has not decided whether scientific speech is so protected, but the
factors it discussed in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) have been pointed to by commentators as suggesting such
protection would be available. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward
Constitutional Protection of Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978).
65
OLC Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press (May 11, 1978), reprinted in The Government’s
Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1980) [hereinafter Harmon Memo].
66
Harmon Memo, supra note 60, at 5.
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information would be "justifiable under the First Amendment only to the
extent that the information is properly classified or classifiable."67

It

concluded "that the present ITAR licensing scheme does not meet
constitutional standards."68
Following revision of the ITAR in December of 1980,69 OLC
issued its second series of opinions on the constitutionality of the ITAR
regime.70 The 1981 opinion stated that "if speech is arguably protected by
the First Amendment, it may not be subjected to prior restraint except in
the most extraordinary cases" and that "[p]rior restraint . . . is
presumptively unconstitutional."71

Because it did not "impose on the

government the burden of obtaining prompt judicial review of any State
Department decision barring the communication of cryptographic
information," the OLC concluded that a requirement that a license be
obtained before publication was an impermissible prior restraint.72
No revision of the ITAR to address the issues raised in the OLC
memos has occurred. The Justice Department, even though it revisited the
issues in 1984 to review them light of later decisions, has neither retracted
this memo nor recanted its substance. This, combined with the known
related cases discussed herein73 supports the position that (hitherto)
67

Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
69
Revision of the Traffic in Arms Regulation, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,970 (Dec. 19, 1980).
70
Constitutionality of the Proposed Revision of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 202 (1981).
71
Id. at 212.
72
Id. at 205 (the present regulations still do not require the government to initiate a
prompt judicial review of the denial of an export license for cryptographic data).
73
First Amendment protection is not limited to political speech – as the following
sections demonstrate, scientific speech may be a form of self expression as well as the
means of exposition of ideas contributing to social and political developments. See also
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 2000); Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the
Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405
(1982).
68
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publicly available scientific information related to university-based work
involving experimental, research, and scientific satellites (and associated
equipment, related systems, and scientific payloads) is a form of protected
speech.
B. THE ITAR IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD IN VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
1. VAGUENESS
Under American law, statutes and regulations must clearly define
their terms and proscriptions, to ensure that people “of ordinary
intelligence will have a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited.”74 Consequently, they are to be written clearly, without
ambiguity, and free of internal inconsistencies, because a law with such
defects fails to give warning to those who wish to act lawfully. A vague
law is therefore objectionable on that basis alone.75 However, vaguely
written regulations are additionally objectionable because they permit
arbitrary and discriminatory application.76
A vague law or regulation touching on first amendment rights is
particularly pernicious as it inhibits the exercise of those rights by
rendering uncertain what expression is permissible.77 Greater clarity is
required of laws affecting first amendment interests.78
a. Clear, Unambiguous, Consistent
Scientific communication of public domain information clearly
should enjoy First Amendment protection79 and the ITAR exemption for
74

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Id.
76
Id. at 108-09.
77
Id. at 109.
78
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976).
79
Notwithstanding the preeminence of political expression with regard to affording First
Amendment protection, such protection is not limited to political speech – scientific
75
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public domain information would seem to be aimed at this concern.80
(Whether dissemination of space-based or satellite-related fundamental
research poses a compelling or substantial threat to national security
sufficient to justify the imposition of disclosure restrictions is discussed
elsewhere in this article; see “Licensing Controls on Fundamental
Research Constitute an Unconstitutional ‘Prior Restraint’). However, the
ITAR’s treatment of public domain information is inconsistent, and in
particular founders with regard to what may be considered a “defense
service.”
“Fundamental Research” is comprised of basic and applied
research in science and engineering, the results of which are placed in the
public domain.81 This concept is similar to the exemption for “general
scientific, mathematical or engineering principles” commonly taught in
schools and universities.82 The definition of ITAR-controlled technical
data also excludes information in the public domain. But tucked away in
ITAR Part 124, “Agreements, Off-Shore Procurement, and Other Defense
Services,” is the following statement:
“The requirements of this section apply whether or not
technical data is to be disclosed or used in the performance
of the services described in 120.9(a) of this subchapter
speech may be a form of self-expression as well as the means of exposition of ideas
contributing to social and political developments. See infra notes 65-68. See also
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bernstein v. U.S. Department
of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn,
192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 2000); Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the
Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405
(1982).
80
Indeed, executive branch agencies funding fundamental research generally require that
the research be published promptly and with wide dissemination. See, e.g., The Nat’l
Science Foundation, National Science Foundation Grant General Conditions (GC-1), p.
17 (July 1, 2002); Nat’l Institutes of Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement (Rev. 03/01),
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, p. 122 (Mar. 2001); Office of Naval Research,
Educational Institutions, Nonprofit Institutions, and For-Profit Organizations: Research
Grant Terms and Conditions, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, p. 6 (July 2001).
81
22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8) (2004).
82
22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2004).
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(e.g., all the information relied upon by the U.S. person in
performing the defense service is in the public domain or is
otherwise exempt from the licensing requirements of this
subchapter pursuant to 125.4 [exemptions of general
applicability] of this subchapter).”83
Thus, it appears that one may also be deemed to provide a defense
service by innocently engaging in certain transactions other than the
explicit “training” of foreign nationals in military skills or use of defense
articles. Under this rubric, merely providing a foreign person with public
domain information could qualify as providing a defense service.
Many research universities have aero-astro departments and teach
courses in a wide variety of related disciplines. Universities also undertake
research carried out in earth-orbit or outer space, which requires the
development of scientific equipment to detect and record information in
that extreme environment. This research equipment must be affixed to
(and become the payload in) the satellite that will be its platform in space,
a satellite with a preponderant civilian use. Both these types of universitybased endeavors constitute basic and applied research in science and
engineering, the conduct and results of which are in the public domain. In
both types of space-related activity, the interdisciplinary synergy produces
vibrant research, which expands knowledge in many fields. This research
naturally generates an abundance of scientific and technical papers, which
are presented at conferences, published in the appropriate journals, and
widely disseminated within the interested academic and scientific
communities.
This kind of publicly conducted research would appear to fall
squarely within the exceptions to licensing found at 22 CFR 120.11 (2),

83

22 C.F.R. § 124.1(a) (2004).
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(3), (6) and (8). It would also appear to be a form of protected speech.84
Certainly anyone taking to heart the language of NSDD 189, or the
fundamental research exemption found at 22 CFR 120.11(8) for “basic
and applied research in science and engineering,” would believe that, for
example, a new silicon wafer particle detector that they had been
developed to conduct space-based research would be an advance they
were free to discuss with their peers everywhere.
Indeed, publications involving these disciplines necessarily contain
information about spacecraft and associated equipment and scientific
payloads. It is often the case that openly conducted research, especially
where collaboration is involved, will be the subject of daily postings to
more-or-less public websites. That same information will become part of
the curriculum and thus also constitutes “general scientific, mathematical
or engineering principles” commonly taught in schools and universities.
Given the conflict between the ITAR definition of fundamental research as
encompassing “applied research in science and engineering”85 and the
ITAR statement elsewhere that its exemptions from licensing do not apply
to “applied research,”86 are new research devices or technological
advances that may have relevance to spacecraft actually defense articles?
Would a disclosure about the new application be a “defense service” or
“technical assistance” as per 22 CFR 124.1(a) if there is an international
cohort among one’s students? Would the conduct of an international
84

See, e.g., Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(“Cryptographic algorithms and theory are often published in scientific journals. …
however, cryptographic algorithms are also covered by … the USML. Given these two
facts, it would be hard for scientists to discern when their work was a defense article and
when it was exempt from the ITAR … In fields of applied science, what is commonly
taught in universities may well overlap with what the government might choose to
regulate. In this instance, the deterrent effect on expression appears both real and
substantial (citations omitted).”).
85
22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8) (2004).
86
22 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)(3) (2004).
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collaboration to develop and emplace a new space telescope (which is,
after all, a remote sensing device) violate the provision that says a
foreigner may not be given access to public domain information unless
one first obtains a license?87 Is this the case even though the device has a
preponderant civilian use?
Even highly knowledgeable and experienced people, and certainly
those of us of ordinary intelligence, would have enormous difficulty
determining what behavior or speech would be prohibited or permitted
after reading the ITAR. Consequently, they will be uncertain as to what
speech is subject to regulation. The resulting anxiety will have a chilling
effect, inhibiting such speech – especially if the penalty for certain
violations of the ITAR can be imprisonment as well as a fine.88
This chilling effect has already caused academicians to reconsider
whether to engage in informal scientific exchanges with their international
colleagues, whether and how to engage their foreign students in research
projects, and whether to present papers at conferences where there may be
an international audience (almost any conference will have such a makeup). Foreign academic researchers reportedly have been denied access to
fundamental research at U.S. universities due to fears that it might be
subject to ITAR disclosure restrictions, and some American researchers
were uncertain as to whether they needed to obtain a license from the State
Department for potential conversations, discussions, meetings or other
87

Obtaining a license is a tortured, prolonged, and difficult process, and if granted, the
license will generally be shot through with restrictions based on nationality, country of
origin, ethnicity, or citizenship. Persons from certain countries, although they have been
given a visa to study or research here, based on a State Department process that requires
the government processor to know exactly what is going to be studied or researched and
where, may still be excluded from an export license pertaining to that very activity
pursuant to ITAR. With regard to international collaborations, the ever-shifting cast of
participants makes the timely obtaining of a license almost impossible. Finally, once
registered with the Department of State for licensing purposes, an entity may lose all
ability to invoke the fundamental research exclusion for its work thereafter.
88
22 C.F.R. § 120.27 (2004) and 22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004).

Vol. 2 [2003]

SPACE-BASED FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH & ITAR
Rachel Lehmer Claus, Esq.

26

informal scientific exchanges with foreign colleagues about fundamental
research that might arguably (someday, maybe) have a defense-related
potential.89
This has not been the limit of the impact. As recently noted in the
journal “IEEE Spectrum Online” by Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor
Emeritus at MIT:
“ITAR has hurt the U.S. satellite industry, mainly through
lost markets share. It has also battered the academic spacescience community. Proposed projects have been delayed;
some talented non-U.S. scientists have decided not to try to
work with their counterparts in the United States; non-U.S.
graduate students in U.S. universities have been excluded
from some scientific meetings related to their projects;
discussions at some international scientific meetings have
been constrained or aborted; and university-industry
collaborations have been disrupted.”90
The internal inconsistencies just described render the ITAR
impermissibly vague and ineluctably uncertain as to the applicability of
the law with regard to space-based or satellite-reliant fundamental
research carried out as U.S. universities.
b. Arbitrary Application

89

Association of American Universities, ITAR and Universities: Universities are
Educational Institutions, Not Munitions Manufacturers, at
http://www.aau.edu/sheets/ITAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); The State Department
issued “clarification” in the spring of 2003 (International Traffic in Arms Regulations:
Exemptions for U.S. Institutions of Higher Education, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,099-15,101 (Mar.
29,2003)). State reiterated that it was State Department policy to not regulate
fundamental research and that the “…the March transfer of commercial communications
satellites to the USML did not change this policy.” However, this language does not
appear in the so-called clarifying regulations, and the new exemptions of general
applicability provided by the Final Rule (22 C.F.R. § 123.16(b)(10) (2003) and §
125.4(d)(1) (2003)) are limited to public domain information, which nominally is not
subject to ITAR control in the first place.
90
Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Security and Sanity, IEEE SPECTRUM, April 2003, at 14.
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As noted at the outset of this section, vaguely written regulations
are additionally flawed because they permit arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Moreover, the resulting arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is in violation of the due process requirements of our
constitution, because one cannot know with any confidence what activity
is prohibited. The regulations are not clear to those being regulated, and
they are no more clear to those doing the regulating.
Because of the lack of consistent, clear guiding principles, a
regulator has complete discretion to establish the degree of protection that
he or she may feel is appropriate. Many appear to assume that, in any
dialog that occurs between a U.S. person and a foreign person, the U.S.
person has superior knowledge that must be safeguarded. Under this
scenario, consider whether a U.S. student, employed as a lab assistant to a
visiting Ph.D. physics professor from abroad, should be required to obtain
a license to provide a “defense service,” in spite of the fact that she would
be performing trivial duties associated with carrying out public domain
fundamental research (and advancing her academic career by working)
with the foreign physicist.
The vagueness of the regulations makes the regulators unsure, and
this uncertainty is an incentive to err on the side of conservatism.
Understandably, in the current environment,a regulator is likely to be
entirely concerned about failing to prevent the nefarious exploitation of
our information and technology and thus require a license regardless of
what the ITAR may permit. It is anecdotally reported that this concern,
placed in the vague and twisting maze of the ITAR and bereft of
instruction as to constitutional constraints, has led to rulings that defective
foreign components cannot be returned to their country of origin for repair
without an export license from the State Department.
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Similarly, approval for a transfer of an on-orbit satellite (that is,
one already placed in earth orbit), to provide communications services to
India languished for a year at the State Department, even though the
satellite was French built (rendering the issue of technology transfer
moot), reportedly because it contained some U.S. components – which had
already been vetted for release pursuant to the license that approved sale
of the components to the French in the first place.91
2. OVERBREADTH
A law is overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct in attempting to restrain legitimately
prohibited activity.92

Where the enactment “unquestionably attaches

sanctions to protected conduct, the likelihood that the statute will deter
that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth
attack.”93 In 1984, just as the ITAR reissued, the Justice Department
revisited the Harmon Memo to consider two intervening Supreme Court
decisions, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) and Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); it concluded that the
revised ITAR would still "appear to us to present sensitive constitutional
issues" and that there was still an unconstitutional "remaining
overbreadth."94
91

For an interesting discussion of other examples, see Alice P. Gast, Mass. Inst. Tech.,
The Impact of Restricting Information Access on Science and Technology, at
http://www.aau.edu/research/Gast.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) and Genevieve J. Knezo,
Sensitive but Unclassified’ and Other Federal Security Controls on Scientific and
Technical Information: History and Current Controversy, Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31845.pdf
(last modified July 2, 2003).
92
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
93
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
n.19 (1984) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207 (1975)).
94
Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for Davis R. Robinson
Legal Adviser [sic] Department of State at Section IV, at
http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/simms_robinson.memo (Jul. 5, 1985).
Related letters that are similarly interesting reading may be found at
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The ITAR, at 22 CFR 124.1(a), specifically states that the giving to
a foreign national of even public domain information otherwise exempted
from licensing is a defense service requiring a license. Assuming, as we
have been, that publicly available scientific information that constitutes
fundamental research is protected speech, and given that a violation of the
ITAR can result in both criminal and civil penalties,95 then the licensing
requirement is likely to deter speech containing information about
fundamental research in the aero-astro field generally or any research
taking place in outer space. Such an outcome fairly compels the
conclusion that, with regard to public domain information pertaining to
space-based or satellite-related research, the ITAR is overbroad and
constitutes in application a denial of due process.
C. LICENSING CONTROLS ON FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL “PRIOR RESTRAINT”
As acknowledged earlier in this discussion, some scientific
communication may be so embedded in a legitimately regulated
transaction that such speech itself may be restricted “as a necessary
incident” to regulating the export of munitions.96 Even fully protected
speech may be disclosure restricted as a compelling threat to national

http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/olson_mcconnell.letter and
http://www.eff.org/Activism/FOIA/ITAR_FOIA/mcconnell_garn.letter.
95
22 C.F.R. pt. 127 (2004).
96
United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978).

Vol. 2 [2003]

SPACE-BASED FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH & ITAR
Rachel Lehmer Claus, Esq.

30

security if its disclosure would result in a danger that is immediate97 and
certain.98
For purposes of this discussion, the question of whether the
expression of scientific information derived from fundamental research
qualifies as protected speech is answered in the affirmative.99 Although
there is a dearth of cases on this point,100 the issue of disclosure of
scientific information is not a new one and much has been written about
the subject over the years.101

Notwithstanding the preeminence of

political expression with regard to affording First Amendment
protection,102 such protection is not limited to political speech. For
example, the First Amendment protects the rights of union members to
97

See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971), (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that a threat to national security will not justify “even the issuance of
an interim restraining order” unless the threat will “inevitably, directly, and immediately
cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at
sea.”). See also id. at 730, (Stewart & White, JJ. Concurring) (stating that the threat must
result in “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to the nation.”).
98
See id. at 726-27.
99
The constitutional infirmities which the Justice Department repeatedly identified in the
ITAR remain there today. There is still no provision for prompt judicial review, at the
government's instigation, of decisions to prohibit dissemination of cryptographic
information outside the United States. See 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 7,8 (1984).
100
See generally Bernstein v. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(discussing protected scientific speech). See also Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing public domain information, speech,
and export controls), Reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th
Cir. 1999).
101
See generally National Academy of Sciences, Report for the Department of State –
Science and Foreign Relations, U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C. (1950); Edward
Teller, Secrecy: The Road to Nowhere, TECH. REV., October 1981, at 12; Committee on
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (U.S.) – Panel on Scientific Communication and
National Security, Scientific Communication and National Security: A Report, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C. (1982); Association of American Universities, ITAR
and Universities: Universities Are Educational Institutions, Not Munitions
Manufacturers, at http://www.aau.edu/sheets/ITAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); Shiela
Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the MIT Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access
to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, at
http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/publicinterest.pdf (June 12, 2002); Charles M. Vest,
Response and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in Research and
Education, at http://web.mit.edu/president/communications/rpt01-02.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2004).
102
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Vol. 2 [2003]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

31

associate for the purpose of discussing the hiring of an attorney,103 an act
that is merely a management decision not intended to advance a political
or social agenda. That scientific speech may constitute self-expression and
the exposition of ideas contributing to the general social good has been
discussed most recently in the Bernstein case,104 but it has also been a
subject of legal discussion for decades.105 Assuming scientific expression
is protected speech, and that fundamental research (public domain)
discussions constitute scientific expression, this inquiry turns directly to
the question of whether dissemination of fundamental research that is
space-based or satellite-related poses a compelling threat to national
security, sufficient to overcome its protected status.
1. An Immediate and Certain Danger Sufficient to Permit
Restriction on Otherwise Protected Speech?
We are concerned here with basically two types of spacecraftrelated information: first, that which is owned (and was generated by) a
private party or entity and needed by a university researcher to
successfully seat an experiment in a satellite provided by the third party (a
vendor’s “interface information”), and second, that which derives from the
diligent application of general principles of mathematics, science, and
engineering in aeronautical and astronautical disciplines in a U.S.
institution of higher education (“university-generated information”).
An earlier commentator opined that scientific information poses an
immediate threat if it meets three criteria: 1) the time from its receipt by a
foreign power to its actual application is short as measured on an
appropriate time scale of technological development; 2) it has identifiable
103

See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
Bernstein v. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted en banc
and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
105
See generally James R. Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem
in First Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 533-43 (1981) (discussing,
among other things, the political value of free scientific expression).
104
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direct military uses or related production applicability; and 3) it would
give the enemy an identifiable, material military advantage over the
United States.106 He also proposed the additional condition that the United
States be the exclusive source of the information (on the basis that it
would be pointless to suppress information available in other countries).107
Given the reasonableness and utility of this approach, it is adopted here.
With these criteria in mind, consider this: Design and
manufacturing information about the satellites and rockets generally used
by universities to provide a platform for their spacebased research had
been in the public domain for a considerable amount of time before such
data was suddenly declared disclosure restricted by the State Department.
Moreover, when utilizing these “workhorse” spacecraft, the interface
between the scientific apparatus and the satellite in which it will be seated
is limited largely to the interface area alone. Recall much of this interface
information had previously been a matter of public knowledge, along with
information about heat, vibration, and radiation hardening requirements
(also known as “shake and bake” data).108
a. Interface Information
With regard to space-based research projects that require only a
relatively simple means to reach and maintain a location in space, the
disclosure to university researchers,collaborators and students of the
interface layer and the requisite “shake and bake” information, seems
unlikely to result in any danger. These satellites have had a preponderant
civilian application, never were intended to serve a military purpose, and
106

Roger Funk, Comment, National Security Controls on the Dissemination of Privately
Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 405 (1982).
107
Id.
108
ITAR limits those to whom this interface information may be disclosed, which means
that foreign collaborators or students who design and develop the very scientific
apparatus that is to carry out the research may not be told important fabrication details. 22
C.F.R. § 125.4(b)(10) (2004).
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have well-known (public) specifications as a result of prior disclosure.
Being able to visually access the interface area of such a transport vehicle
would not result in the identification by the observer of direct military uses
and would not provide the observer’s military with a specific military
advantage. Even if all the interface information were made immediately
available to a foreign military, an immediate threat would not result; one
cannot reverseengineer a satellite, even an “old technology” satellite, from
this interface information. Additionally, this type of information is readily
available from commercial foreign sources. Therefore, a vendor’s
unrestricted provision of satellite interface information to a university’s
researchers, as an aid in their fabrication of an experimental apparatus,
would not pose a compelling threat to national security.

b. University-Generated Information
University aero-astro departments and the ancillary programs in
departments of mechanical engineering, optics, and electrical engineering,
have steadily provided innovation after innovation. The Global
Positioning System is but one example of university-based fundamental
research giving rise to a useful technology, one with clear civilian
applications and performance equivalence as well as military utility. Often
military applications derive from a new technology that came from initial
civilian application and purpose. This type of research is openly conducted
and is comprised of “basic and applied research in science and
engineering” of the type vouchsafed by NSDD 189. That is, it is to
proceed largely unfettered by deemed export constraints, precisely in order
to facilitate the bringing of the best available minds to bear on any
problem. It is worthwhile to repeat that policy here, a policy which
expressly took into account the possibility that United States’ enemies
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might obtain some advantage by participating in our universities or their
products and which concluded that the benefits outweighed the risk:
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum
extent possible, the products of fundamental research
remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this
Administration that, where the national security requires
control, the mechanism for control of information
generated during federally funded fundamental research in
science, technology and engineering at colleges,
universities and laboratories is classification. Each federal
government agency is responsible for: a) determining
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if
so, controlling the research results through standard
classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all
research grants, contracts or cooperative agreements for
potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon
the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundament
research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S.
Statutes.109
In other words, the President and the National Security Council
determined, at the height of the cold war, thoughtfully and with
deliberation, that keeping fundamental research in the public domain did
not pose a compelling threat to national security.
On that basis, one may confidently assert that university-generated
spacecraft-related fundamental research does not present an immediate
and certain danger. And it must be clear that the U.S. is not the only
country in the world with universities that engage in, and whose
researchers have the full complement of knowledge about, spacecraft and
associated systems.110 Therefore, the expression of scientific information
109

National Security Decision Directive 189, supra note 1.
In this regard, it may be warranted to recall that terrorist impacts such as that
experienced on Sept. 11, 2001 in the United States were neither reliant on high
technology nor satellite-related.
110
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about fundamental research in spacecraft constitutes protected speech that
does not pose a national security threat of such status as to warrant
imposition of disclosure restrictions.
2. Appropriate Disclosure Restrictions, or Impermissible Prior
Restraint?
We now turn to the issue of whether such public domain scientific
exchange is impermissibly subjected to prior restraint by virtue of the
ITAR controls that may appear to apply to that speech.
a. License Prerequisite to Protected Speech
While the bulk of the ITAR scheme is aimed not at expression but
at containment of defense-related commodities, a licensing requirement
that would apply to disclosure of even public domain information is
clearly likely to capture a particular type of protected expression: scientific
exchange in the realm of fundamental research conducted openly within a
university context. Prior restraint may be found when the restriction has a
“close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly associated
with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat of identified
censorship risks.”111 A regulation requiring that a license be obtained
before one may discuss public domain information with a foreign person
in the US, as does the ITAR at 124.1(a), would seem to demonstrate
exactly that relationship between speech and censorship and thus
constitutes a prior restraint.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that any prior restraint on
expression “comes to this Court with a ’heavy presumption’ against its
constitutional validity.”112 Justice Brennan, in the Pentagon Papers case,
concluded that the First Amendment’s ban on prior restraints could only
111

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988).
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citing Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963)).
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be overridden in times of war and even then, according to Justice Stewart,
only when disclosure would “surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our nation or its people.”113 While national security
is and should be accorded a great deal of deference and some speech may
be properly restricted when it is “a necessary incident” to the controlling
the export of weapons,114 the mere brandishing of the term “national
security” without more is too amorphous a rationale to abrogate the
protections of the First Amendment.115
Consequently, at a minimum, any attempt to license, censor or
restrain protected speech must satisfy a series of procedural and
substantive requirements.
b. A Lack of Procedural Safeguards
If a licensing scheme controlling the export of speech or public
domain publication (a prior restraint) does not employ sufficient
procedural safeguards, it must be invalidated. The licensing scheme would
be invalid, not because it is necessarily content based, but because it
bestows on a government official too much discretionary power to
procedurally hinder or even prevent expression by virtue of multiple or
periodic licensing requirements.116
For a licensing requirement on the export of speech to be
constitutional, it must be subject to three procedural safeguards: 1) a
specific and reasonable time is set for the making of a licensing decision,
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New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 at 726, 730 (1971).
United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
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New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 719.
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Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 760.
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2) provision is made for prompt judicial review, and 3) the censor bears
the burden of going to court and justifying a licensing denial.117
The Arms Export Control Act excludes from the Administrative
Procedures Act the functions to be implemented in the ITAR.118 There is
no limit to the time in which the Office of Defense Trade Controls
(ODTC) must make a licensing decision. The ITAR does not provide for
judicial review of licensing decisions, and the initial designation of items
as defense articles is not reviewable. Because there is no such recourse,
there is no burden on ODTC to justify any denial.
Thus, The ITAR scheme fails on every count. As it pertains to
expression concerning space-based or satellite-related fundamental
research, it constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on protected
speech.
III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Openness in fundamental research is a critical element of most
universities’ teaching and research mission (certainly a hallmark of those,
like Stanford University, which are not engaged in any classified
research). Integral to openness, and just as critical, is participation by an
international array of faculty, students, and collaborators. Those with
comparable education, experience, and skills earned abroad bring their
accomplishments and intellectual capital to U.S. academies in order to
further their studies or the studies of our students. The result is an
exchange of ideas and concepts among peers of equal intellectual strength;
these ideas and concepts are challenged, scrutinized, encouraged,
criticized and honed. As recently stated by Bernard Bailyn, albeit in a
117

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215. 227-28 (1990) (citing Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965)).
118
22 U.S.C. §§ 2752, 2778, 2780, 2792, 2797. “Because the exercising of the foreign
affairs function, including the decisions required to implement the Arms Export Control
Act, is highly discretionary, it is excluded from review under the Administrative
Procedure Act.” 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2004).
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somewhat different context, “. . .most often the creative imagination does
not flare in isolation. Creative minds stimulate each other, interaction and
competition have a generative effect, sparks fly from disagreement and
rivalry, and entire groups become creative.”119 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in mathematics, the hard sciences, engineering, and related
disciplines. No price can be placed upon the value of such an environment.
It is possible that the protections afforded protected speech by the
national policy covering fundamental research may not prevail and that the
dissemination and participation restrictions of a "deemed export" may be
brought to bear on the disciplines mentioned. If so, a cascade of adverse
effects may flow. If important courses are consequently eliminated, for
example, and class sizes and research projects diminish due to restrictions
on participation by foreigners, then U.S. students may choose to go
abroad, where they can obtain the full complement of courses in their
disciplines. Their foreign peers, unable to complete their studies or fully
participate in research here, may remain abroad. Moreover, if a university
accedes to ITAR’s disclosure restrictions for its space-based or satellitereliant/related research, it may find that thereafter ALL its research is
subject to such controls. Why? Because ITAR provides that the
acceptance of dissemination, participation, and access restrictions on
research may destroy entirely the "fundamental research" character of the
work – it is as yet unknown whether this “taint” would result in ITAR
application in areas not satellite-related.120
As has been asked elsewhere:
[D]oes secrecy actually begin to erode national security
when it chokes off the exchange of information that enables
119

BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 3 (2003).
120
22 C.F.R. § 120.11(8)(ii). Government imposition of access and dissemination
controls destroys the “fundamental research” character of the endeavor.
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a vital research community to thrive and innovate. …
Under ITAR, even discussing information about controlled
technology with a non-U.S. citizen is a crime punishable by
imprisonment or steep fines. And, strangely, it doesn’t
matter if the information has already been published and is
freely available on the Internet.… In countless
technologies, from nuclear bombs to encryption software,
the genie is out of the bottle. It is flitting around the
Internet and lurking on the shelves of science libraries all
over the world. Uncertain times call for prudent
restrictions. But pretending that violent extremists and the
enemies of progress and freedom cannot read or use the
Internet might very will harm the security we are striving to
maintain.121
Perhaps of gravest concern is the potential for further
diminishment of our academies’ ability to produce U.S. graduates in
rocketry, satellite technology, and similar fields that draw upon
mathematics, the hard sciences, and engineering. The best and brightest
American minds in any discipline reliant on space-based research (for
example, aeronautics, astrophysics, and environmental and biological
sciences related to space exploration) may end up developing and
contributing their research talents elsewhere. Thus, there will be far fewer
of these talented U.S. citizens in domestic academies to engage in
federally funded research, which may ultimately have adverse
consequences for national security interests.
In concluding, I would like to again quote Dr. Skolnikoff:
[O]f course, restrictions on publication or sharing of
information are sometimes necessary. When they are, they
must be designed intelligently and in consultation with the
affected industry and universities. They must have a clear
and realistic purpose, and be formulated in the realization
that the nation, and its technical and scientific
establishments, have been incredibly well served by
maintaining open channels of communication. We must not
121
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lose sight of the fact that the strength of science and
technology in the United States is one of its greatest assets
in the fight against terrorism.122
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